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PRESUPPOSITION
DRAFT
A presupposition is a precondition of a sentence such that the sentences cannot be uttered
meaningfully unless the presupposition is satisfied. The concept of a Presupposition is
due to Gottlob Frege (1892), but the English term was coined by Strawson (1950).
Presupposition theory is an area of active research at the SEMANTICS/PRAGMATICS
interface. A related term is Conventional Implicature. Grice (1975) distinguished
between presuppositions and conventional implicatures, however, it is still under debate
whether Grice's distinction is necessary (Potts 2007).
DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONs have played a big role in the development of
presupposition theory and are still generally analyzed as introducing a presupposition.
Consider for example (1). No entity that satisfies the description biggest natural number
exists. What is the status of (1)? Is it true or false?
(1) The biggest natural number is prime.
Presupposition theory says (1) is neither true nor false: a definite description the NP
presupposes the existence of an individual that satisfies NP – in other words, definite
descriptions carry an existence presupposition. Presupposition failure describes the case
when a presupposition is not fulfilled like (1). Presupposition failures are analyzed as
being neither true nor false, but as being truth-value gaps. Presupposition theory
therefore relies on a distinction between three possible truth-values a sentence may have:
true, false, and undefined. One important argument in support of a third truth-value has
been the interaction between negation and presuppositions: a presupposition failure in
many cases remains a presupposition failure even when the sentence is negated:
(2) The biggest natural number is not prime.
That (2) is just like (1) a presupposition failure follows if negation does not change the
conditions under which a sentence has a truth value. Negation can be used in this way as
a presupposition test: A presupposition follows from a sentence and its negation. The
assertion, on the other hand, only follows from the sentence itself, and not from its
negation.Just like the existence presupposition of the sentences in (1) and (2) is triggered by the
definite article the, many other words trigger presuppositions. Levinson's (1983)
textbook lists several pages of presupposition triggers in English. A particularly
interesting paradigm is that in (3) (cf. Abusch 2005): (3a) has no relevant lexically
triggered presupposition. (3b) presupposes that it is actually raining outside and asserts
that Bill thinks so, too. Finally, (3c) presupposes that Bill thinks that it is raining outside,
and asserts that it actually is raining outside—be right exhibits the opposite behavior of
know. Paradigm (3) shows that it mus be part of our specific knowledge about think,
know,a n dbe right whether they trigger a presupposition and which one.
(3) a. Bill thinks that it's raining outside.
b. Bill knows that it's raining outside.
c. Bill is right that it's raining outside.
Some presuppositions are not lexically triggered. For example, (3a) cannot be
used if it known that it really is raining outside. This presupposition, however, has been
analyzed as an implicated presupposition (Sauerland 2007). It can be derived in a similar
way to CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURES as arising from the avoidance of a
presupposition trigger and a principle of presupposition maximization (Heim 1991).
One central problem of presupposition theory is the question how to predict the
presuppositions of complex sentences – the problem of presupposition projection.
Karttunen and Peters show that, while negation does not affect presuppositions, in other
complex sentences presupposition triggers can occur, but the presupposition may not
project to the entire sentence: In example (4), the conditional clause blocks projection of
the existence presupposition of the biggest natural number.
(4) If there was a biggest natural number, the biggest natural number would be prime.
Building on work by Stalnaker (1973) and Karttunen (1974), Heim (1983) has developed
an influential account of presupposition projection that has given rise to dynamic
semantics (see also Beaver 2001, Kadmon 2001). However, recent work by Schlenker
(2007) has cast many of these results in a very different light, and the subject is still
debated lively.
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